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Restructuring electricity markets has enabled wholesalers to exercise market power. Using a common
method of measuring competitive behavior in these markets, several studies have found substantial
inefficiencies. This method overstates actual welfare loss by ignoring production constraints that result
in non-convex costs. I develop an alternative method that accounts for these constraints and apply
it to the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland market. For the summer following restructuring,
the common method implies that market imperfections resulted in considerable welfare loss, with
actual production costs exceeding the competitive model's estimates by 13 to 21 percent. In contrast,
my method finds that actual costs were only between three and eight percent above the competitive
levels. In particular, it is the fringe firms whose costs increase, while strategic firms reduce production
and costs.
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Restructuring electricity markets has enabled wholesalers to exercise market power. Using
a common method of measuring competitive behavior in these markets, several studies have
found substantial ineﬃciencies.1 This paper argues that this method overstates actual welfare
loss. I develop an alternative method that accounts for ﬁrms’ production constraints that
result in cost non-convexities. The paper then applies the method to the Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Maryland (PJM) wholesale electricity market.
In general, welfare loss may occur because of allocative and production ineﬃciencies.
However, wholesale electricity markets do not have allocative ineﬃciencies, in the short run,
because derived demand is nearly completely inelastic. There are two reasons for this. First,
consumers have no incentive to reduce quantity demanded at higher wholesale prices because
the regulatory structure of electricity retail markets has kept consumers’ rates constant.2
Second, the ﬁrms that procure customers’ electricity in the wholesale market are mandated
to provide the power at any cost.
Therefore, the only short run welfare eﬀects in electricity markets result from ineﬃcient
production. Strategic ﬁrms with asymmetric costs, or ﬁrms with asymmetric strategies,
distort production decisions from the competitive equilibrium (Borenstein and Farrell, 2000).
This causes cross-ﬁrm production ineﬃciencies. Individually, a ﬁrm will achieve a given
1This method has been used primarily to measure markups (for example, see Wolfram, 1999; Joskow and
Kahn, 2002. and Mansur, 2007). However, it has also been used to quantify welfare loss (for example, see
Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak, 2002).
2A few customers have “interruptible” contracts that are exercised when the quantity demanded ap-
proaches the capacity of supply, causing customers to curtail the quantity of electricity demanded. As this
does not depend on price, demand shifts but remains completely inelastic.
1output level by minimizing its own production costs. However, in aggregate, the output level
is not produced using the least costly technology.3 This paper measures these production
distortions.
The standard method, which is referred to as the competitive benchmark analysis, has
been developed to simulate wholesale electricity prices that are consistent with a competitive
market.4 This “static” method ignores production constraints and has primarily been used to
measure market transfers. In addition, Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (henceforth BBW,
2002) use this method to quantify welfare loss. In this paper, I predict output decisions
for a similar “static” competitive benchmark analysis counterfactual for the PJM market. I
then compare the static model’s total variable costs with actual variable costs. For the ﬁrst
summer after PJM restructured, in 1999, the actual costs substantially exceeded these static
simulations of competitive costs.
However, by ignoring certain types of production constraints, this method overstates
production ineﬃciencies from restructuring. This static technique assumes that power plants
operate following an on-oﬀ strategy of producing at full capacity if and only if price exceeds
(or equals) marginal costs of production. Yet, the process of producing electricity eﬃciently
3Furthermore, an individual oligopolist will not necessarily produce less than it would have in a perfectly
competitive market. Levin (1985) shows that, in an oligopoly with asymmetric costs, some producers may
increase production relative to competitive levels. Note that ﬁrms can potentially exercise market power
without distorting production; if all ﬁrms uniformly increase bids, the optimal order of production will not
be distorted.
4Wolfram (1999) uses this technique to examine pricing in the England and Wales electricity market.
Since then, the technique has been used in studies of many other markets including: California (Borenstein,
Bushnell, and Wolak, 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002); New England (Bushnell and Saravia, 2002); and
PJM (Mansur, 2007). Other studies have made similar assumptions about intertemporal constraints in
determining marginal costs. These include Wolfram (1998), Wolak (2000), Wolak (2003), Hortacsu and
Puller (2004), Fabra and Toro (2005), and Puller (2007).
2requires that ﬁrms consider several non-convexities in costs. For example, when a ﬁrm starts
a “generating unit” in order to produce electricity, it incurs start up costs that typically
range between $100 and $7000.5 These costs impose intertemporal constraints on production
decisions.
With start up costs, it may be more eﬃc i e n tt oc o n t i n u eo p e r a t i n gag e n e r a t i n gu n i tw i t h
a relatively high marginal cost than to ﬁre up a unit with lower marginal costs (but which
would have to incur start up costs). This trade-oﬀ between higher marginal costs and start
up costs is of great practical importance. With large within-day variation in demand and no
economically feasible method of storing electricity, demand is met with a variety of current
generation technologies.6 This practical reality makes the exercise of this paper particularly
relevant.
Harvey and Hogan (2001a and 2001b) and others have noted the ramiﬁcations of ignoring
production constraints in simulating equilibrium prices.7 Electrical engineers have studied
this “unit commitment” problem extensively. Using many methods, they solve the cost
minimization problem subject to production constraints and an equilibrium condition.8
5Power plants consist of several, independently operating “generating units,” each comprised of a boiler,
a generator, and a smoke stack. This range represents the 5th and 95th percentile of start up costs for
coal, oil and natural gas generating units in the Eastern U.S. transmission grid using output data from the
PROSYM model (Kahn, 2000).
6The amount of within-day variation in hourly demand can be quite signiﬁcant. For example, the average
coeﬃcient of variation, within a day, in the US is approximately 0.15 (Holland and Mansur, 2006).
7Harvey and Hogan (2001a) note that: “It is a straightforward result of unit commitment logic that when
[start-up costs, minimum-load costs, and operating parameters such as minimum down times and run times]
exist, it will at times be more eﬃcient to meet load with high incremental cost output from a unit that
is already on-line or a high-cost but quick-start unit, than to meet that load by starting a unit with low
incremental energy costs but a long star t - u pt i m eo rh i g hs t a r t - u pc o s t s . ”
8The methods include exhaustive enumeration, dynamic programming, mixed-integer programming, La-
grangian relaxation, and artiﬁcial neural networks. See Sheble and Fahd (1994) for an overview of the
literature.
3In contrast to the engineering literature, this paper uses a revealed preferences argument
to determine how cost-minimizing ﬁrms behave. I provide an ex-post analysis of ﬁrms’ pro-
duction behavior assuming that they have solved the unit commitment problem. It is not
the intention of this paper to solve the diﬃcult optimization problem in order to construct
a counterfactual benchmark. The purpose is to ask whether, by ignoring production con-
straints, the static method common to the literature is likely to result in substantial biases
in measuring welfare. I do this by using a reduced-form representation of ﬁrm behavior.
With data from the summer of 1998, prior to restructuring, this paper examines the
factors involved in ﬁrms’ actual production decisions. I model production as a function of
prices and costs, allowing the coeﬃcients to diﬀer by generating unit. First, I use these
coeﬃcient estimates to predict production levels for the pre-restructuring period. For this
period, my “intertemporal” model ﬁts actual production decisions substantially better than
the static model. Then, using the coeﬃcient estimates, I extrapolate how ﬁrms would have
behaved in 1999 had restructuring not occurred.
For the initial summer of restructuring, I compare actual variable costs with estimates
of variable costs from my intertemporal model. First, I estimate variable costs using the
actual prices. That summer, ﬁrms did set prices above those that would have occurred in
a competitive market (Mansur, 2007). If post-restructuring prices exceeded those clearing a
competitive market, then estimates based on observed prices will overstate production and
costs. In turn, this will understate the welfare loss, for both the intertemporal and static
models. To address this, I also develop a counterfactual set of prices that are consistent with
4pre-restructuring behavior.
For the static and intertemporal models, the paper calculates bounds on the welfare losses
associated with restructuring the PJM market. As a lower bound, the welfare estimates based
on observed prices imply that actual costs exceeded the intertemporal model’s estimates by
only three percent. This is substantially less than the predictions generated using the static
competitive benchmark analysis technique (13 percent).
As discussed below, the welfare estimates based on conservative estimates of competitive
prices provide upper bounds of the deadweight loss. Using these predicted prices, I estimate
greater welfare loss for both the intertemporal (eight percent of production costs) and static
(21 percent) models. With either set of prices, I ﬁnd that the static model overstates welfare
eﬀects.
The paper then examines whether these welfare eﬀects are consistent with ﬁrms’ incen-
tives. Two ﬁrms in PJM had incentives to increase prices in the summer of 1999 (Mansur,
2007). I ﬁnd that, relative to the output decisions predicted with the intertemporal model for
the post-restructuring period, these oligopolists produced less while the other price-taking
“fringe” ﬁrms produced more. The welfare eﬀects are similarly distributed. Namely, for
the strategic ﬁrms, actual production costs were $17-37 million, or ﬁve to ten percent, less
than those predicted by the intertemporal model. In contrast, actual production costs were
$79-121 million, or seven to 11 percent, greater for the fringe ﬁrms.
I conclude that restructuring the PJM market did result in welfare loss, mostly likely due
to wholesalers exercising market power. Using my intertemporal model, I estimate that these
5losses were between three and eight percent of total variable costs during the ﬁrst summer
after the market was restructured. In contrast, the static model overstates welfare loss by
about three-fold. That model predicts losses between 13 and 21 percent.
Section 2 brieﬂy outlines the PJM wholesale electricity market. Section 3 deﬁnes the
optimization problem of competitive ﬁrms while accounting for intertemporal constraints.
Section 4 explains the econometric technique and data used in estimating the intertemporal
model. Then, Section 5 discusses the static model. In Section 6, I compare how well the
models predict observed behavior prior to restructuring. Section 7 examines the welfare im-
pacts of market imperfections due to restructuring. The section compares actual production
costs with those computed with the intertemporal and static models. Section 8 discusses the
consistency of the welfare eﬀects with ﬁrms’ incentives and Section 9 concludes.
2 The PJM Electricity Market
2.1 Market Rules
In the late 1990s, the PJM Interconnection L.L.C. consisted of most or all of Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware and the District of Columbia, as well as some of Virginia.
While integrated with the Eastern U.S. transmission grid, the market has been regulated as
a single entity based on transmission reliability concerns. In 1997, PJM began facilitating
trades among regulated utilities and independent producers by establishing a spot market.
The market uses a uniform-price sealed-bid auction for the right to supply power. Firms
oﬀer ﬂexible bid curves on a day-ahead basis. This study focuses on the summers of 1998
and 1999. During this period, ﬁrms had no obligation either to produce or to otherwise cover
6a bid if they made oﬀers to supply electricity.9 In 1998, PJM adopted what is known as a
“nodal” pricing system in order to account for transmission capacity constraints.10
When the nodal market ﬁrst opened, suppliers were required to make “cost-based” bids
for each generating unit. In other words, the producers had to bid their marginal costs
of production that had been determined by years of regulatory rate hearings. A notable
step in restructuring PJM occurred in April, 1999, when the requirement on the energy bid
component was relaxed. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission granted ﬁrms the right
to change generating units from making cost-based bids to oﬀe r i n gam o r eﬂexible type of
bid. These “market-based” bids were subject to a price cap of $1000 per megawatt-hour
(MWh).
2.2 Market Structure
While most utilities obtained the right to bid units as market-based, many of the generating
units continued to be oﬀered as cost-based bids during most of the summer of 1999. Firms
may have opted not to switch if they had little incentive to exercise market power. In
particular, those ﬁrms that either purchased electricity in the market or supplied their own
generation may have less of an incentive to increase wholesale prices. The degree of vertical
integration of PJM ﬁrms helps explain their incentives and behavior.11
9The PJM Market Monitoring Unit (2000) wrote the following about PJM in 1999: “During the time
period covered by this report, unit oﬀers and PJM’s day-ahead scheduling did not constitute or create binding
ﬁnancial commitments to provide a deﬁned amount of energy at a deﬁned price.”
10Each node is a point where energy is supplied, demanded, or transmitted. When congestion occurs, the
PJM energy market can have over 2000 prices. For more on nodal pricing, see Schweppe, et al. (1988). In
the summers of 1998 and 1999, the transmission system was constrained about 15 and 18 percent of the
hours, respectively.
11Mansur (2007) discusses this issue in greater detail. The discussion below summarizes the market
structure and ﬁrms’ incentives that are outlined in that paper.
7The large PJM ﬁrms are vertically integrated; they generate electricity and have oblig-
ations to provide power to retail customers. These ﬁrms had to provide exogenously deter-
mined quantities of retail obligations (or “native load”) at ﬁxed rates. The greater the retail
obligation, the less incentive a ﬁrm has to set high prices. The objective function (assuming
quantity setting behavior) for vertically integrated ﬁrm i can be written:
max
qi






i − Ci(qi), (1)
where, Pi(qi) is the inverse residual demand function ﬁrm i faces in the spot market, qi is
its production, rd
i and qd
i are the retail price and native load, and Ci(qi) is total production
costs. The resulting ﬁrst order condition implies:
Pi + P
0





where ﬁrms have incentives to increase prices only if they are net sellers: qi >q d
i.
While most ﬁrms remained nearly completely integrated after restructuring, two ﬁrms,
PECO and PPL, were large net sellers and thus had incentives to exercise oligopoly power
by raising wholesale prices. The reason for this variation in ﬁrms’ net positions is due, in
part, to diﬀerences in state policies. PECO and PPL are located in Pennsylvania, where
regulators enacted an aggressive retail choice policy that rewarded customers for leaving
their historic providers. These ﬁrms were no longer completely integrated and, because of
regulatory action, were large net sellers in the wholesale market. In other states in the PJM
region, which did not follow such a policy, customers stayed with their incumbent utilities.
For each of the eight major utilities in PJM, Panel A of Table 1 shows the shares of
capacity, generation, peak generation, and demand served. For both PECO and PPL, the
8share of peak generation is about double their shares of retail customers’ demand served. In
contrast, Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) had a slightly larger share of demand than
of generation, on average. Thus, PSE&G beneﬁts from lower prices and would exercise its
oligopsony power by producing from units with marginal costs above price. This behavior
would lower the market price. The other ﬁrms, including the largest producer GPU, had
similar market shares of peak generation and demand served. For these ﬁrms, the ﬁrst order
condition is close to that of a price-taking ﬁrm (Pi = C0
i).
Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences method, Mansur (2007) tests the importance of vertical
integration in understanding ﬁrm behavior in the PJM market. He ﬁnds that PECO and
PPL did produce signiﬁcantly less than other ﬁrms after restructuring.12 In Section 8, I
compare actual production decisions with those of the intertemporal model in order to test
whether behavior is consistent with the incentives of ﬁrms.
2.3 Electricity Prices and Restructuring
Prices increased substantially from the summer of 1998 to the summer of 1999. From April
through September, 1998, the average of the actual prices was $26.04 per MWh. The fol-
lowing summer, the average price was $37.97 per MWh.13
These higher wholesale electricity prices are partially explained by higher input prices in
the summer of 1999 than in the previous summer. Average natural gas prices increased from
$2.33 to $2.60 per mmBTU.14 Average oil prices went from $16.30 to $20.56 per barrel.15
12In a news article, Smith and Fialka (1999) corroborate this ﬁnding. They describe the bidding behavior
of PECO and PPL as making “the most of steamy conditions.”
13Electricity price data are from PJM Interconnection. See www.pjm.com.
14Data on natural gas prices at Transco Zone 6 non-New York are from the Natural Gas Intelligence.
15Number two heating oil sold at New York Harbor data are from the U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
9Tradeable permits for sulfur dioxide emissions increased from $172.44 per ton in the summer
of 1998 to $202.71 per ton in the following summer.16
In addition, environmental regulation of nitrogen oxides began in the summer of 1999.
Tradeable permits for the Ozone Transport Commission regulation started near $5000 per
ton but fell dramatically to under $1000 per ton by the end of the summer. For each ton
emitted from May through September, ﬁr m sw e r er e q u i r e dt oh a v ea no ﬀsetting permit by
the end of the year.
Increases in input costs, which were also accompanied by greater demand for electricity,
will result in higher prices in a competitive market. Using a method similar to BBW,
Mansur (2007) simulates competitive prices during the summers of 1998 and 1999. During
the summer of 1998, the simulations of the competitive prices were quite similar to the
observed prices. The mean of the simulated competitive prices was $25.93 per MWh, or
11 cents below the observed average price. In contrast, the predicted competitive prices
averaged $32.33 per MWh in the summer following restructuring. While greater than the
competitive price in the summer of 1998, this is approximately $5.64 per MWh below the
actual average price during the summer of 1999. Hence, Mansur ﬁnds evidence of market
imperfections after restructuring but not before restructuring.
tration.
16EPA reports monthly average trades of sulfur dioxide permits at two brokerage ﬁrms: Cantor Fitzgerald
and Fieldston. I report the mean of the monthly prices.
102.4 Power Plant Characteristics
For each of the major ﬁrms, Panel B of Table 1 reports 1999 generation capacity categorized
by primary fuel type. Firms produce electricity using a variety of technologies, which is
in part due to the longevity of outdated power plants. Furthermore, because of current
technological limits on the storage and production of electricity, even a new generation
system would require a mix of technologies. “Baseload” generating units operate at low
marginal costs most hours. More ﬂexible “peaking” units operate at high marginal costs
just a few hours a day.
In 1999, the market consisted of approximately 57,000 megawatts (MW) of capacity,
including nuclear, hydroelectric, coal, natural gas, and oil energy sources (see Figure 1). Nu-
clear and coal plants provide baseload generation capable of covering most of the demand.
Nuclear power comprises 45 percent of generation but only 24 percent of capacity. In con-
trast, natural gas and oil burning units provide over a third of the market’s capacity, yet
they operate only during peak demand times. These diﬀerences in utilization result from
heterogeneous cost structures. Baseload units have low marginal costs and signiﬁcant in-
tertemporal constraints, like large start up costs, while the relatively ﬂexible peaking units
are more expensive to operate. The next section discusses how these constraints enter into
a competitive ﬁrm’s optimization problem.
113 Intertemporal Model of Competitive Production
Price-taking ﬁrms obtain proﬁt maximization by optimizing each unit’s production sepa-
rately. In contrast, a strategic ﬁrm will consider how much is being produced at other
plants. The more that is being produced at other plants, the more a strategic ﬁrm will proﬁt
by reducing output from the competitive level in order to increase prices (Wolfram, 1998). In
addition, a strategic ﬁrm will consider the quantity that it committed to sell under long term
ﬁnancial contracts with ﬁxed rates (Wolak, 2000). For a ﬁrm taking prices as given, neither
a ﬁrm’s production at other plants nor its contractual agreements aﬀect optimization. This
section examines the optimization problem for a ﬁrm that takes prices as given and faces
non-convexities in costs.
Several technologically-induced intertemporal constraints limit a ﬁrm’s ability to produce
electricity. As previously mentioned, after unit i shuts down, in order to resume operation
at hour t,t h eﬁrm incurs “start up” costs (STARTi). Ramping rates (Ri) limit the speed
at which units change hourly production, i.e., how much output can be changed in one
hour. Constraints on minimum load (MINi) limit how little a unit can generate without
shutting down. These intertemporal constraints create non-convexities in ﬁrms’ production
cost functions.17 To ﬁxi d e a s ,Ib e g i nw i t has i m p l i ﬁed unit commitment problem.
I model the ﬁrm operating unit i as solving a deterministic, discrete-time dynamic pro-
gram.18 The state variable, Sit, equals the level of production going into period t.T h ec h o i c e
17There are other intertemporal constraints as well. For example, a unit may have to remain operating
for some time once it starts before it can be shut down. Conversely, a unit may have to remain oﬀ ac e r t a i n
amount of time before restarting. There may be some costs that the ﬁrm incurs regardless of the amount
produced (for example, operating fans and conveyor belts).
18This model diﬀers from engineering models. Here, I take prices as exogenous. Typically, engineers solve
12variable, xit, equals the change in the level of production in period t. The law of motion of
Sit is similar to the literature on extraction of non-renewable resources where xit represents
t h ec h a n g ei nt h es t a t ev a r i a b l e : Sit + xit = St+1.
The value function, V (Sit), depends on several parameters. I assume that ﬁrms take price,
Pt, as given. Variable costs are assumed to be linear such that cit is a constant marginal
cost of production. Capacity, CAPi, restricts unit i’s maximum range of operation. The
discount factor is δ. Given these parameters, and the intertemporal constraints STARTi,
Ri,a n dMINi the Bellman equation equals:
V (Sit)= m a x
xit∈[−Ri,Ri]
(Pt − cit) · (xit + Sit) − f(xit,S it) · STARTi + δV(xit + Sit) (3)
s.t. : xit + Sit ≥ g(xit,S it) · MINi, and xit + Sit ≤ CAPi,
where f(xit,S it) indicates starting and g(xit,S it) indicates continuing to operate:
f(xit,S it)={
1 if xit > 0 and Sit =0
0 else , and (4)
g(xit,S it)={
1 if xit + Sit > 0 and Sit > 0
0 else . (5)
Intertemporal constraints may reduce a unit’s true marginal cost; for example, postponing
shutting down at low prices may improve overall proﬁts since the ﬁrm avoids restarting the
unit later on when prices rise. Intertemporal constraints may also increase marginal costs.
Again, using the case of start up costs, a ﬁrm will not operate even when prices exceed
marginal costs of production if rents are not substantial enough to cover the cost of starting.
for the least cost manner to meet the quantity demanded and solve for the price, or “system lambda.”
13If intertemporal constraints are inconsequential, then the optimization problem for price-
taking ﬁrms can be further simpliﬁed. As the optimization problem is no longer state depen-




(Pt − cit)qit. (6)
With no intertemporal constraints, these ﬁrms operate units at full capacity when price
exceeds (or equals) marginal cost. Otherwise, they do not produce. This is referred to as
the static competitive benchmark analysis model and is explored in Section 5. Given this
description of competitive ﬁrms’ optimization problem, the following section explains the
method used to account for intertemporal constraints in order to determine a competitive
counterfactual market outcome.
4 Method for Estimating Intertemporal Model
4.1 Econometric Model
In this section, I develop a method for estimating competitive behavior for the post-restructuring
period while accounting for intertemporal constraints. First, I estimate the ﬁrms’ produc-
tion decisions using data from a period before restructuring. The coeﬃcient estimates from
the regression are used to predict production both in the pre-restructuring period of 1998
and for the post-restructuring period of 1999. A key identifying assumption is that, before
restructuring, ﬁrms behaved competitively by taking prices as given and minimizing costs.
I argue that, while power plants were regulated in 1998, their short run operations were
consistent with competitive behavior. Surely this regulated market did not exemplify perfect
14competition. Firms invested ineﬃciently and probably distorted marginal costs of production
by making ineﬃcient decisions regarding maintenance, labor, and capital allocation including
pollution abatement technologies. However, given these costs, operators likely dispatched
units in a least-cost manner.19 As previously mentioned, Mansur (2007) ﬁnds simulated
prices that are close to actual prices, on average, for the summer of 1998. These ﬁndings
support the claim made in this paper: in 1998, ﬁrm behavior was consistent with that of a
competitive market.
Unlike production models that estimate the optimal mix of inputs, production costs are
known in this case. Rather, I estimate how constraints aﬀect the ﬁrm’s dynamic optimization
problem. An alternative approach would be to make a direct calculation of the dynamically
optimal solution. However, this would require information on the exact method the system
operators use to dispatch units and on the ways ﬁrms form expectations about future prices.
This paper proposes an approach that econometrically estimates the relationship between
output decisions and ﬁrm and industry characteristics.20
Based on (3), I assert that a price-taking ﬁrm will choose current output as a function
of historic, current, and future price-cost markups, as well as intertemporal constraints. I
19Under regulation, some argue that ﬁrms had incentives to minimize eﬀort rather than costs and therefore
did not operate eﬃciently. Firms may have let units operate during low demand times instead of stopping
and restarting them. If restructuring improved eﬃciency then, conditional on market conditions, more starts
would be expected in the summer of 1999 than in that of 1998. Without controlling for market conditions,
the number of starts for the units in my sample decreased from 3970 to 3846.
Furthermore, even in 1998, ﬁrms could have withheld production from units that would have operated in a
competitive market. However, as cost-based bids determined prices, the ability to move prices may have been
limited. In contrast, in 1999, the ﬂexibility of using bids as well as quantity may have facilitated exercising
market power to the degree that ﬁrms circumvented constraints, such as regulatory surveillance. In addition,
these historically regulated utilities may have undergone a learning process about how to exercise market
power.
20Unlike a dynamic model, the method I use does not make assumptions on how ﬁrms make forecasts of
future prices. Rather, I test whether there is a correlation between future prices and production behavior.
15estimate a descriptive model of output (qit) at unit i during hour t.Aﬁrm produces more
given greater current price-cost markups (pcmit = Pt − cit). My model incorporates the
static model by including an indicator variable of positive markups (pcm_posit). If the
static model is correct, this variable should fully explain production decisions. In addition,
I include a linear term of pcmit.
If the ﬁrm expects prices to increase in the near future, it may also increase production
now. Therefore, I include markups for the following hour: pcmi,t+1. Also, if a ﬁrm is slow to
adjust, it may consider average markups (pcmit) for today and tomorrow. Furthermore, if
markups were recently high, the ﬁrm may have chosen a high value of Sit and is more likely
to be operating. Therefore, greater markups in the recent past will also be important in
determining current production so the model includes hourly-lagged markups, pcmi,t−1,a n d
yesterday’s average markup, pcmi,t−24.
Other characteristics (like start up costs, ramping rates, minimum load, and unit capac-
ity) do not vary by time. They cannot be separately identiﬁed from an idiosyncratic unit
ﬁxed eﬀect.21 Furthermore, these characteristics are likely to impact how ﬁrms respond to
the series of price-cost markups. Therefore, I allow the coeﬃcients on the price-cost markups
to diﬀer by unit as well as include unit ﬁxed eﬀects (αi).
Recall that this is a model of a competitive market and is based on observed behavior
in the pre-restructuring period of 1998 (q
pre
it ). Therefore, I do not take into consideration
21Note that the other unit commitment issues mentioned in footnotes 7 and 17 (such as minimum up
times, minimum down times, no load costs) are also unit speciﬁc and will be captured by the unit ﬁxed eﬀect
in a similar manner. Thus, this method addresses allu n i tc o m m i t m e n tp r o b l e m st h a te i t h e rd on o tv a r y
over time or are correlated with price-cost markups.
16strategic variables, such as output at other plants. For the pre-restructuring period, I deﬁne
Xit as the set of independent variables, namely the seven measures of price-cost markups












More explicitly, I model output in the pre-restructuring period as:
qit = αi + β1,ipcm_posit + β2,ipcmit + β3,ipcmi,t−1 + β4,ipcmi,t+1 (8)
+β5,ipcmit + β6,ipcmi,t−24 + β7,ipcmi,t+24 + εit.
To allow for a ﬂexible form, all variables (except the ﬁxed eﬀects and pcm_posit indicators)
are estimated as ﬁfth-order polynomial functions. This data-ﬁtting method is designed for
predictive power. For each of the 130 units, I separately estimate ordinary least-squares co-
eﬃcients and Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors (assuming a 24 hour lag structure).




i ) to determine a compet-
itive counterfactual of production (b qit) both in sample, for 1998:
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pre
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and also out of sample for the post-restructuring period of 1999:
b q
post
it = b α
pre





Some of the predicted output levels, b qit, are not plausible and are truncated. For example,
if the predicted value is below zero, then I truncate the prediction at zero because this is a
17physical constraint. As discussed in the data section below, I deﬁne capacity as the maximum
observed amount of production in either 1998 or 1999. If the predicted value is greater than
capacity, then I truncate at this amount.
4.2 Caveats on the Estimation Method
First, regressing output on price-cost markups will result in biased coeﬃcients if either prices
or marginal costs are endogenous. However, recall that the coeﬃcients are estimated for 1998
only, before the market was restructured. As mentioned above, during this period, ﬁrms’
behavior is assumed to be consistent with that of a competitive market: I assume ﬁrms
cannot change the price. Furthermore, as discussed below, the marginal cost of production
is assumed to be constant for a given unit and a given day. Increasing output may increase a
ﬁrm’s marginal cost as it operates more expensive units, but the marginal cost of production
for a given unit will not change. For these reasons, I can estimate (8) using ordinary least-
squares.
Second, I assume that the relationship between output and markups would not have
changed had restructuring not occurred. Furthermore, I place bounds on the welfare esti-
mates. For the lower bound, I assume that the price-cost markups (X
post
it )w o u l dn o th a v e
changed from the observed levels had restructuring not occurred. In other words, the null
hypothesis, in this case, is that restructuring did not result in market power. If ﬁrms did set
high prices in 1999, these estimates will overstate production and therefore overstate costs.
This places a lower bound on the welfare eﬀects of a given model but will not necessarily
bias the relative welfare eﬀects of the intertemporal and static models. I deﬁne the upper
18bound by constructing conservative estimates of prices that are consistent with competition.
Third, this reduced form method requires a common support of the exogenous variables.
In both summers, actual prices ranged from $0 to $999 per MWh. While the high prices
were more frequent after restructuring, there were some times when prices were extremely
high before restructuring, potentially reﬂecting scarcity rents. The range of hourly price-cost
markups were quite similar pre- and post-restructuring.22
4.3 Data
The intertemporal model requires data on hourly prices, actual hourly unit-level production,
and daily unit-level marginal costs. PJM reports quantity-weighted average nodal hourly
prices. The EPA’s Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) provides actual hourly
gross generation for most fossil fuel burning units.23 Gross generation includes the electricity
generated for sales (net generation) as well as the electricity produced to operate that power
plant. Typically, net generation is 90 to 95 percent of gross generation. CEMS data are
highly accurate and comprehensive for most types of fossil units (Joskow and Kahn, 2002).
Throughout this analysis, I deﬁne my sample to be a panel of the 130 units in the CEMS
data that operated during both summers. These units account for approximately 92 percent
22In my sample, the markups faced by all generating units (regardless of whether they operated or not)
ranged from $-114 to $986 per MWh in the pre-restructuring summer. They averaged $-1.92 per MWh. After
restructuring, the markups ranged from $-134 to $984 per MWh and averaged $4.79 per MWh. Conditional
on operating, the pre-restructuring markups ranged from $-87 to $986 per MWh (and averaged $7.09 per
MWh). The post-restructuring markups ranged from $-121 to $984 per MWh (and averaged $21.16 per
MWh).
23CEMS records hourly gross production of electricity, heat input, and three pollutants—sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxides, and carbon dioxide—for most fossil units in the country. During the summers of 1998 and
1999, CEMS monitored 234 units that accounted for over 97 percent of PJM’s fossil fuel capacity. In order
to comply with the 1990 Clean Air Act, fossil-fuel generating electric producers are required to report hourly
emissions and electricity production by unit. Regulation aﬀects units of 25 MW capacity plus new units
under 25 megawatts that use fuel with a sulfur content greater than 0.05% by weight.
19of the fossil generation in PJM.24
I calculate marginal costs using a typical engineering formula based on years of regulation.
A unit’s marginal cost of production up to capacity (cit) is independent of production:











where VOM i is variable operating and maintenance cost and HR is an eﬃciency measure
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rates. I merge production data with data on unit characteristics and input prices.26 Id e ﬁne
24During the summer of 1998, the units in the sample produced on average 16,653 gross MWh per hour (or
approximately 15,820 net MWh per hour). According to the EPA’s eGRID database, fossil units produced
an average of 17,237 net MWh per hour in 1998.
25Constant marginal costs is an assumption. As power plants increase output, they run more eﬃciently
and the heat rate falls, thereby reducing the marginal cost. To test the importance of this assumption, I look
at the variation in hourly heat rates reported in the CEMS data. For the PJM generating units during the
summers of 1998 and 1999, I regress hourly heat rates on unit ﬁxed eﬀects. Overall, the ﬁxed eﬀects explain
only eight percent of the variation. However, this is primarily due to some extreme outliers. Dropping the
lowest and highest one (ﬁve) percent of the heat rates, the ﬁxed eﬀects explain about 60 (70) percent of
the variation. Similarly, due to locational marginal pricing, the price a ﬁrm would earn may diﬀer slightly
from the load-weighted average price that I use in the study. As mentioned in footnote 10, about a sixth of
the hours in my sample exhibit congestion. However, during this time period, congestion did not result in
large price diﬀerences, on average, within PJM (see www.pjm.com). I conclude that the errors-in-variables
problem from incorrectly measuring price-cost markups is likely to be small.
26PROSYM (Kahn, 2000) provides data on heat rate, coal costs, sulfur dioxide emissions rates, nitrogen
oxides emissions rates, and variable operating and maintenance costs. I measure fuel prices using spot prices
of oil and natural gas while assuming constant coal costs. EIA provides data on the daily spot price of
New York Harbor No. 2 heating oil and BTU/gallon conversion rates. Natural Gas Intelligence provided
daily natural gas spot prices for Transco Zone 6 non-New York. For oil and natural gas units, I add fuel
distribution costs that I approximate as the diﬀerence between the average spot price in the region and the
price PJM ﬁrms reports for delivered fuel over the summers of 1998 and 1999 (EIA form 423, 1998 and 1999).
Unit speciﬁc coal prices are from Kahn (2000). To calculate SO2 regulation costs, I use the mean of two
monthly price indices of SO2 permit prices that brokerage ﬁrms Cantor Fitzgerald and Fieldston report to
the EPA. The EPA lists which units had to comply with the Acid Rain program during Phase I (including
“substituting” units). Few ﬁrms traded in the new NOx permits when it ﬁrst opened. In fact, they had
until the end of the year to “true up" their allowances with actual emissions. About once a month, Cantor
Fitzgerald reports data on NOx prices which started near $5000/ton in May and ended around $1000/ton in
September. By November, the price had fallen to $723/ton. I deﬁne the NOx price to be $2000/ton, which
is approximately the average of the NOx prices from May until December, 1999. Plants in Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, and Delaware had NOx regulatory compliance obligations in 1999.
20capacity (CAPi) as the maximum observed gross production over the summers of 1998 and
1999.
5 Static Competitive Benchmark Analysis
The static competitive benchmark analysis counterfactual assumes no intertemporal con-
straints. As with Section 4, the null hypothesis in this section is that, post-restructuring,
ﬁrms continued to take prices as given. Thus, I assume that the N units in my sample would











where, for unit i at hour t, qit is actual production and q∗
it is the static competitive counter-
factual of production.
Figure 2 depicts the measure of welfare loss for the static model. The ﬁgure includes two
marginal cost curves: the marginal cost curve where strategic ﬁrms actually produce and the
marginal costs of competitive supply. Residual demand equals the market demand, which is
nearly perfectly inelastic, less the response from fringe units.
The fringe is comprised of some PJM units that are not in the balanced panel. The EPA
does not monitor units that are small or do not emit air pollution. In addition, some plants
did not operate in one of the summers and, therefore, were not in the balanced sample. The
fringe also includes plants in areas bordering PJM that export power to PJM. The fringe
ﬁrms are assumed to be competitive. When ﬁrms in the sample exercise market power,
21the marginal costs are greater because of ineﬃcient production. The welfare loss is (at a
minimum) the grey area between the strategic and competitive marginal cost curves.
Note that if ﬁrms exercise market power, then the total amount produced by all strategic
ﬁrms, Qt, will be less than the competitive equilibrium, Q∗
t. By assuming that the com-
petitive output equals the observed level, the gray area ignores the changes in imports and
other units not in the sample. This assumption implies that calculations of deadweight loss
will be understated. The hashed area in Figure 2 accounts for the additional economic gains
from competition. In the next section, I measure both the gray and hashed areas: the gray
area is measured by using actual prices while the additional welfare loss is captured using
an alternative set of prices that are consistent with a competitive market.
The static technique assumes that the units would be dispatched in order of marginal
cost and produce at full capacity. However, whenever a ﬁrm attempts to generate using unit
i, their is some probability, fi, that the unit will not be able to operate. As with BBW,
this model accounts for these “forced outages” by using Monte Carlo simulations. For each
hour in the sample, outages are simulated by drawing ξit from a [0,1] uniform distribution.
If ξit is less than fi, the unit cannot operate. For every hour and Monte Carlo simulation,
each unit’s output is calculated. A unit’s hourly production, q∗
it, equals the mean of 100
simulation draws. See Mansur (2007) for a discussion of the additional data used for this
method.
226C o m p a r i s o n o f M o d e l s
6.1 Comparing Predictive Power of Models
For the pre-restructuring period, Table 2 summarizes the results of estimating (8). For each
variable, I compute the mean of the 130 unit-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients and their standard errors.
As expected, the coeﬃcients on the price-cost margins tend to be positive. The static
model variable, pcm_pos,i ss i g n i ﬁcant and positive. However, the other variables do have
predictive power. I report the number of units for which each coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level. The hourly lead pcm variables are signiﬁcant for most units whereas the
daily lag pcm variables are signiﬁcant for about a third of the units. For each observation,
I calculated the marginal eﬀect for each of the six markup variables. The table shows the
average of these marginal eﬀects. The average of the marginal eﬀects for the hourly markups
are similar to the average of the linear coeﬃcients. However, for the three sets of daily
markup measures, the marginal eﬀects diﬀer from the linear coeﬃcients. The hourly and
daily lead pcm terms have large marginal eﬀects, suggesting that ﬁrms are considering what
future prices are likely to be when making decisions on how much to produce. The model
has an R-squared of 0.81.
Next, I compare whether the intertemporal or static model is a better predictor of actual
generation in 1998. If intertemporal constraints were unimportant, then the ﬂexible econo-
metric model would not necessarily be better. I normalize generation by capacity to give
equal weight to all observations. The ratio of generation to capacity is called the utilization
rate. The correlation of actual utilization rates to static utilization rate estimates is 0.61.
23In contrast, the correlation of actual utilization rates with intertemporal utilization rate
estimates is 0.79.27
For the summer before PJM restructured, Figure 3 plots a kernel regression of markups
ranging from -$30 to $30/MWh on actual utilization rates (black line).28 As markups in-
crease, the average utilization rate rises slowly from 0.2 to 0.8. The intertemporal model (the
dashed, dark gray line) closely ﬁts observed behavior. In contrast, the static competitive
benchmark analysis model assumes that units do not operate if markups are negative and
operate at capacity when price exceeds marginal costs. This static model is depicted with
the light gray line. This ﬁgure suggests that intertemporal constraints do matter in ﬁrms’
production decisions. By failing to account for these constraints, the static model is a poor
predictor, on average, of actual production.
The intertemporal model also is a better predictor of when power plants start up. Pre-
restructuring, the average number of times a unit in my sample started each month was
5.09.29 Over this period, the intertemporal model predicts 4.78 starts per month while the
27A more formal test requires the use of some non-nested test, since there does not exist a mapping of
one utilization rate estimate to the other. I follow the method of an encompassing test, as described in
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). This is done by testing one hypothesis and including the variables from
the second hypothesis that are not already in the model. In this case, I regress actual utilization rates on
the intertemporal model estimates, and also include the static model’s estimates. If one model’s predicted
values are signiﬁcant and the other is not, then that model is determined to be the better predictor. As
above, I estimate the Newey-West (1987) standard errors with a 24 hour lag structure. As the independent
variables are estimated, I correct the errors using the method suggested by Murphy and Topel (1985). The
coeﬃcient on the intertemporal model’s estimate is 0.92 (s.e. of 0.01). The static model’s coeﬃcient is 0.09
(0.01). While this is smaller in magnitude, it is still signiﬁcant. Therefore, neither model can be rejected.
28T h e s ea r et h e5 th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of price-cost markups in the summer of 1998.
All units in my sample are included in the analysis. I estimate the kernel regression with Stata’s kernreg1
command. The command computes the Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric regression. I deﬁne the number of
equally spaced points to be 30 and use an Epanechnikov weight function.
29As t a r ti sd e ﬁned as zero production in the previous hour and production of at least one MWh both in
the current hour and in the following hour.
24static model predicts approximately twice as many (11.76 per month). In order to address
the implied start up costs of these models, I use a revealed preferences argument. If a ﬁrm
opts to shut down and restart a unit, it must be the case that the unit’s start up costs are
no larger than the proﬁts earned (in expectation) when running. Using the predicted and
actual output decisions for the N units in my sample over the T hours of the pre-restructuring










using the notation from (3) and (4). The average surplus is an upper bound on the implied
start up costs. For the units in my sample, an engineering model (Kahn, 2000) assumes an
(unweighted) average start up cost of $1821. For the pre-restructured period, the average
surplus per start is: $1666 using actual production data; $1740 using the intertemporal
model; and $820 using the static model. The actual average surplus is double that of the
static model while the intertemporal model is a close proxy.
6.2 Comparing Output Predictions by Fuel Type
Another interesting comparison examines which types of power plants operate under these
alternative models. Coal units, which are primarily used for baseload and “shoulder” hour
production, typically have larger start up costs than oil and natural gas ﬁred units. Seeing
diﬀerences in types of generating units could provide further evidence of the importance of
intertemporal constraints. Furthermore, from an environmental perspective, there may be
signiﬁcant consequences as to whether coal, oil, or natural gas plants are operating.
25By fuel type, I compare actual production with the production estimates of both models
for the pre-restructuring period. In aggregate, production levels are similar.30 By fuel type,
the intertemporal model predicts output levels similar to actual production levels: coal (-
0.1%) is used slightly less, while oil (2.5%) and natural gas (2.7%) are used slightly more. In
contrast, the static model overstates the use of coal (9.4%), and vastly understates the use
of oil (-46.1%) and natural gas (-64.2%).31
7 Measuring Aggregate Welfare Eﬀects
Intertemporal constraints may substantially aﬀect output decisions and lead the static model
to overestimate welfare loss. Here, I measure welfare loss based on direct production costs,
namely the variable costs excluding start up costs. During peak hours, intertemporal con-
straints will lead to units with moderate marginal cost of production not starting. This
will require units with high marginal costs of production to operate, increasing the direct
production costs. In contrast, during the middle of the night, intertemporal constraints will
lead to moderate cost units operating at a loss but avoiding start up costs the next morning.
In measuring price-cost margins, BBW argue that these intertemporal biases are po-
tentially oﬀ-setting. Some hours intertemporal constraints increase marginal costs while in
other hours these constraints decrease the costs. However, in the case of measuring welfare,
t h es t a t i cm o d e lw i l lalways overstate welfare losses in competitive markets. If ﬁrms deviate
30This is not surprising given the methods used to estimate the intertemporal model and to construct the
static model.
31For both models, coal is used even more after restructuring while oil and gas are used even less. See
Mansur (forthcoming) for an analysis of the environmental consequences of ﬁrms exercising market power
in the PJM market after restructuring.
26from the static model’s least-cost dispatch in any way, then variable production costs will
necessarily increase.
In this market, short-run welfare loss only results from production ineﬃciencies. I com-
pare the total variable costs of actual production (qit) with the total variable costs of the
competitive counterfactual estimates using both the static (q∗
it) and intertemporal (b qit)m o d -
els. As in Section 3, I assume variable costs to be a linear function: citqit.F o ras a m p l eo f















cit · (qit − b qit). (15)
Note that this measure of welfare does not directly account for any changes in start up costs
or other intertemporal constraints.
In order to place bounds on the amount of deadweight loss associated with exercising
market power in this restructured electricity market, I estimate welfare loss using both
actual prices and counterfactual competitive price estimates. Actual prices exceeding those
of a competitive equilibrium result in too much production and therefore higher production
costs, placing a lower bound on the welfare loss. Conservative estimates of competitive prices
result in low prices, resulting in too little production. This places an upper bound on the
w e l f a r el o s se s t i m a t e .
277.1 Welfare Eﬀects given Actual Prices
First, I measure lower bounds of the welfare estimates using actual prices. Table 3 ex-
amines both the welfare implications of restructuring and the importance of intertemporal
constraints in measuring these welfare eﬀects. The generating units in my sample actually
produced 72 million MWh in the summer of 1998 and 68 million MWh in the following
summer. In 1998, the actual production costs totaled $1.33 billion. In 1999, these costs
increased by 13 percent to $1.50 billion. These costs are compared to those of both the
static and intertemporal models.
The predictions of q∗
it that are based on the static competitive benchmark analysis method
imply substantial welfare loss from restructuring. In the summer of 1999, the static model’s
predicted costs equaled $1.33 billion, implying that production ineﬃciencies (∆W∗)t o t a l e d
$173 million. Welfare losses were 13.0 percent of the competitive production cost estimates.
However, this method also predicts losses even before restructuring. For 1998, this static
model’s predictions of variable production costs were only $1.21 billion. This is $118 million,
or ten percent, less than actual production costs. This model is simulated and therefore,
conditional its assumptions, there are no standard errors for these calculations.
One way to account for intertemporal constrain t si st ot r e a tt h ep r e - r e s t r u c t u r i n gs t a t i c
model estimates as a control group. Assuming that the welfare loss estimates in 1998 resulted
solely from the bias of ignoring these constraints, the welfare eﬀects from restructuring
related market imperfections equal the change in total welfare losses from 1998 to 1999, or
$55 million. Note that this calculation provides an accurate measure of the welfare eﬀects
28only if the bias is constant over time. However, in most cases, demand and cost shocks
will impact this bias. Furthermore, this method requires a control period when prices are
assumed to be determined competitively.
The second method of predicting competitive production, b qit, is based on the intertempo-
ral model. Recall that this reduced-form method does not impose an equilibrium constraint.
Nevertheless, the predicted output is similar to actual output given the observed price-cost
markups.
In the summer of 1998, the intertemporal model’s total variable cost estimates equaled
$1.33 billion, just six million above actual costs. Note that this is not surprising given that
the coeﬃcients are estimated using these pre-restructuring data. However, in 1999, the in-
tertemporal production estimates were $1.46 billion. These cost diﬀerences imply production
ineﬃciencies (∆c W) of $43 million, or three percent, after restructuring. I compute standard
errors on this welfare loss measure based on the errors from Section 6.32 The standard error
on the production ineﬃciencies in 1999 is $11 million. In each year, the intertemporal model
predicts less welfare loss than the static model.
Relative to wealth transfers, the intertemporal model’s estimates of deadweight loss are
small. During the summer of 1999, Mansur (2007) estimates that the costs of procuring
electricity from the PJM spot market exceeded the estimated procurement costs of a perfectly
competitive market by $182 million. The spot market accounts for only ten to 15 percent of
32First, I compute the errors on the predicted output for each unit and hour. I multiply these standard
errors by the marginal cost of production and square the product. This is the measure of variance for the
variable costs of each unit and hour. Finally, I sum across these variances for all units and hours in a summer.
The square root of this sum equals the standard error of the total variable costs. For 1998, the standard
errors are 0.2 million.
29all sales. An additional 30 percent of electricity is sold through bilateral contracts.33 If these
contracts reﬂect markups similar to those in the spot market, then the total procurement
costs increase by $676 million.
I assert that ﬁrms behaved competitively before restructuring in 1998. Therefore, I at-
tribute most of the welfare loss that the static model predicts for 1998 to be actual production
costs that result from intertemporal constraints. Of these $118 million in variable costs, at
most 17 percent can be attributed to start up costs. As noted by BBW, an upper bound
on the share of these variable costs that may be attributed to start up costs is the amount
ﬁrms actually spent starting up. The sampled units’ actual number of starts fell from 4,213
(in the summer of 1998) to 4,081 (in the summer of 1999). Using data on start up costs
from Kahn (2000), the cost of these observed starts totaled $21.6 million in 1998 and $20.4
million in 1999. These ﬁndings suggest that other intertemporal constraints, like ramping
rates and minimum run times, also aﬀect ﬁrms’ production decisions.
7.2 Welfare Eﬀects given Competitive Prices
If ﬁrms did set high prices, then a competitive counterfactual requires price estimates from a
competitive model. Furthermore, the higher observed prices will result in greater predicted
production post-restructuring than would have occurred under competitive prices. Appendix
A describes how I construct counterfactual competitive prices that are likely to provide an
upper bound on these costs.
33In a personal communication, Joe Bowring of the Market Monitoring Unit estimated this level of con-
tracts. In addition, 10 to 15 percent of supply comes from spot market purchases, one to two percent from
imports, and the remaining 53 to 59 percent is self-supplied by ﬁrms.
30Table 4 exhibits the welfare results using these predicted prices. The predicted prices
after restructuring average $32/MWh in contrast to the $38/MWh average of observed prices.
These lower prices resulted in less production by all ﬁrms. The predicted output totals 65.4
million MWh over the summer of 1999, 2.3 million less than observed. This reduction in
output means that ﬁrms incurred fewer variable costs. These costs total only $1394 million
using the intertemporal model, or $105 million below the actual costs. This is 7.5 percent of
the predicted costs, more than double the estimates in Section 7.1.
Note that the 2.3 million MWh output shortfall must be produced somehow. In other
words, the excess demand implies that the competitive prices, in equilibrium, must be greater
than these predicted ones. Therefore, the $105 million provides an upper bound on the
welfare loss.
Similarly, the static model shows increases in welfare losses. For comparison purposes,
I solved the static model such that the aggregate amount produced equals the amount
produced in the intertemporal model (versus actual production). The total variable costs of
$1243 million in 1999 are $256 million less than the observed costs. The same caveat as with
the intertemporal model applies here. That said, the upper bound of welfare losses using
the static model is 21 percent of estimated costs after restructuring.
Ic o n c l u d et h a tt h ew e l f a r el o s s e sa r eg r e a t e rw i t ht h ep r e d i c t e dp r i c e st h a nw i t ha c t u a l
prices. However, the intertemporal model’s losses are still $100 million less than those of the
static model. In other words, the static model continues to exhibit substantial biases. I ﬁnd
qualitatively similar results using several other measures of price.34
34These alternative prices include the pt price estimates described in Appendix A without the additional
317.3 Response of Non-Modeled Firms
Next, I examine how other ﬁrms that are not directly modeled would change behavior given
the alternative predicted prices from Section 7.2. If actual prices exceed those of a compet-
itive market, then not only would the modeled ﬁrms have produced less in a competitive
regime, but so would those power plants that are not directly modeled, including imports.
Appendix B discusses how I estimate the supply function and variable costs for these non-
modeled ﬁrms.
Both pre- and post-restructuring, the non-modeled ﬁrms are more price sensitive during
peak hours. The implied average elasticities pre-restructuring are 0.19, during peak hours,
and 0.13 oﬀ- p e a k( a n do n l yw e a k l ys i g n i ﬁcant). Post-restructuring, the elasticities are even
smaller: 0.08 on peak and 0.06 oﬀ-peak (and insigniﬁcant).
The actual output of these ﬁrms increased by 7.7 million MWh from the summer of 1998
to the summer of 1999. However, even with the predicted prices, the ﬁrms increase output
by 7.2 million MWh. In other words, with inelastic supply from these non-modeled ﬁrms,
there is not much diﬀerence in their production decisions even when the predicted prices are
substantially lower than the actual ones.
Given the modest response by these ﬁrms, the additional welfare eﬀect is only $32 million.
Note that these welfare eﬀects are the same for both the intertemporal and static model.
With a more complex intertemporal model that estimates equilibrium competitive prices,
error terms, the price estimates multiplied by a mean-preserving variable that increases the variance by a
uniform amount, price estimates from a GARCH model, and competitive price estimates based on the static
model from Mansur (2007).
32one could compare that approach’s prices with the static model’s prices. However, as BBW
note, intertemporal constraints both bias their price simulations upwards and downwards
in diﬀerent situations. Therefore, it is not clear for which model the welfare loss would be
greater given my non-modeled ﬁrms’ supply function.
8 Firm Level Analysis
Next, I examine whether these welfare eﬀects are consistent with the incentives of ﬁrms.
Table 5 compares the actual and estimated production and welfare loss of each of the major
ﬁrms in PJM before and after restructuring. From 1998 to 1999, PECO and PPL reduced ac-
tual output at their units in my sample by 10 and 19 percent, respectively. The intertemporal
model also predicts a reduction in output, but only of seven percent for each ﬁrm.
The observed output for most of the other ﬁrms was similar to that predicted by the
intertemporal model. However, PSE&G did increase production substantially. Rather than
reduce output by 15 percent as my model predicts, it increased production by 11 percent
from the summer of 1998 to the summer of 1999. As discussed in Section 2.2, this is also
consistent with the ﬁrm’s incentives.
For the oligopolists, PECO and PPL, Figure 4 shows the goodness-of-ﬁtc o m p a r i s o no f
utilization rates across price-cost markups. I smooth the data using the same kernel regres-
sion method as the previous ﬁgure. Unlike Figure 3, this ﬁgure shows the relationship for
both the pre- and post-restructuring summers. In the pre-restructuring period, the intertem-
poral model “supply” function is similar to the observed. However, after restructuring, these
ﬁr m sp r o d u c e dl e s st h a np r e d i c t e df o rag i v e nm a r k u p .
33In the bottom panel of Table 5, note that the static model predicts much larger reductions
for some ﬁrms. For example, based on the static model’s estimates post-restructuring, one
might conclude that GPU and Baltimore Gas & Electric, as well as PPL, produced less than
would be expected given the observed prices. For either the static or intertemporal model,
PSE&G produces more after restructuring than predicted.
Table 5 also reports the welfare eﬀects of these production distortions. As with produc-
tion, PSE&G’s variable costs were much greater in 1999 than predicted. In contrast, PPL’s
costs are substantially lower. Overall, the oligopolists’ actual production costs were $37
million less than those predicted by the intertemporal model. In contrast, actual production
costs were $79 million greater for the other ﬁrms.
These ﬁrm level eﬀects are relatively robust to the counterfactual competitive price es-
timates. Table 6 reports the ﬁrm level output and welfare eﬀects for the intertemporal and
static models using the predicted prices. The comparison with actual behavior is more dif-
ﬁcult to make as aggregate production is less than the observed with these predicted prices.
Nevertheless, PPL produced less than even that suggested by the intertemporal model us-
ing these counterfactual prices. With these prices, the oligopolists’ actual production costs
were $17 million less than those predicted by the intertemporal model, while they were $121
million greater for the other ﬁrms.
9C o n c l u s i o n s
The competitive benchmark analysis method for measuring competition in restructured
wholesale electricity markets has identiﬁed market failures in many markets. This static
34method ignores intertemporal constraints such as the cost of starting a power plant. This
m a yr e s u l ti nc o m p e t i t i v ep r i c es i m u l a t i o n st h a ta r eb i a s e du p w a r d si ns o m eh o u r sa n d
downwards in others. While the measurement error of this simpliﬁcation may be partially
oﬀsetting in measuring price, it will overstate actual welfare loss due to changes in produc-
tion costs (which ignore changes in start up costs). In other words, if production constraints
bind, then these production costs will increase. For example, I ﬁnd that—even in the sum-
mer before restructuring—the actual variable costs of production were ten percent above the
competitive counterfactual costs. After restructuring, the welfare loss is 13 to 21 percent of
production cost estimates.
In this paper, I develop a measure of competitive production decisions to estimate welfare
while accounting for production constraints. Relative to the static competitive benchmark
analysis technique, my model predicts production behavior more accurately prior to restruc-
turing. Given that ﬁrms have exercised market power, I develop a counterfactual set of prices
that are consistent with competitive behavior. Comparing actual production costs with these
competitive production cost estimates for the summer after restructuring, I estimate that
actual costs exceeded competitive estimates by only three to eight percent, substantially less
than the estimates using the static technique.
The paper also examines whether these welfare eﬀects are consistent with ﬁrms’ incen-
tives. Two PJM ﬁrms had incentives to increase prices in the summer of 1999. I ﬁnd that
these strategic ﬁrms did produce less, while the other price-taking ﬁrms produced more.
The welfare eﬀects are similarly distributed. Namely, for the oligopolists, actual production
35costs were about ﬁve to ten percent less than those predicted by the intertemporal model.
In contrast, actual production costs were seven to 11 percent greater for the price-taking
ﬁrms. For these reasons, the welfare losses measured in this paper are likely the result of
ﬁrms exercising market power.
In conclusion, I ﬁnd that intertemporal constraints result in signiﬁcant non-convexities in
the costs of producing electricity. This suggests that one should be cautious using measures
of welfare eﬀects that ignore the ﬁrms’ dynamic optimization problem. Finally, further
research on modeling strategic ﬁrms’ dynamic problem in these restructured markets may
provide insight into ﬁrm behavior and help develop better restructured markets.
36Appendix A: Predicted Prices
This appendix discusses how I predict prices that are consistent with competitive behavior.
I use an approach similar to the method that I use to predict ﬁrms’ supply decisions (in
Section 4). Namely, I examine the relationship between prices (pt) pre-restructuring and the
quantity demanded. As in BBW, I focus on the demand for fossil supply by subtracting
the inframarginal production of hydroelectric and nuclear power plants. Derived demand
is perfectly inelastic and these non-fossil generators are not likely to respond substantially
to wholesale prices. Thus, net demand (Dnet
t ) is assumed to be perfectly inelastic and the
quantity of net demand will not be correlated with the error term of prices. Hence, ordinary
least squares estimates are unbiased. I allow the coeﬃcient on net demand to vary by hour-
of-day i (as well as include hour-of-day ﬁxed eﬀects) and use a ten part piece-wise linear
spline function (split by decile for each hour):





t + et. (A1)
The function is extremely ﬂexible and ﬁts the pre-restructuring data with an R2 of 0.46.
I use these predicted coeﬃcients to construct a second series of prices for the post-
restructuring period. As in Section 4, this method requires a common support. The range
of net demand in the pre-restructuring summer of 1998 was from 6,301 to 36,679 MW. The
summer after restructuring was quite hot. The net demand increased and the range was
6,997 to 39,841 MW. Thus, there are some predicted prices that are out of sample.
Finally, the predicted prices are adjusted to reﬂect the actual variance observed in 1998.
Note from Figure 3 that supply (the inverse of the function shown) is highly non-linear and,
37for positive price-cost markups, the function is convex. Thus, by Jensen’s inequality, the
supply at the expected price will exceed the expected supply, particularly in high demand
hours. In 1998, the variation of the unadjusted predicted prices (pt)i sm u c hl o w e rt h a nt h e
variation of actual prices (29.5 and 43.5, respectively).
In order to increase the variance, I use the residuals from the regression (A1) based on
the pre-restructuring data. First, I ﬁt an AR(1) process for the residuals:
b et = ρb et−1 + ut, (A2)
and estimate b ρ of 0.72. Then I use a Monte Carlo simulation, drawing from the sample
distribution of ut and reconstruct a new series of e et,w h i c hIa d dt opt to get the adjusted
predicted prices for the post-restructuring period. This is repeated 100 times. For each set
of prices, I calculate the welfare losses and report the mean. As with the main results, I use
actual prices for the pre-restructuring period.
For the summers of 1998 and 1999, Figure A.1 shows the actual and predicted prices
as a function of net demand. A kernel regression is used to smooth over the thousands of
prices. The largest diﬀerence between actual and predicted prices is seen in the high demand
hours of 1999. It is these hours when ﬁrms had the greatest ability to exercise market power
(Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia, 2006).
My predicted prices provide an upper bound on the welfare eﬀects for both the intertem-
poral and static models. In addition to restructuring, the summer of 1999 saw an increase
in input prices for natural gas, fuel oil, and sulfur dioxide. Furthermore, a new nitrogen
oxides tradeable permit regulation began that year, which resulted in higher costs for many
38power plants. The competitive pricing model focuses only on determining the average supply
function and, intentionally, does not include costs. This will result in price estimates that
are likely to be less than what a competitive model would have observed because the cost
increases are not taken into account. Therefore, the actual prices and the predicted prices
provide bounds on the size of the production costs, and therefore welfare eﬀects, for both
models.
Appendix B: Supply Response of Non-Modeled Firms
The quantity supplied by non-modeled ﬁrms (qNM
t ), including net imports into PJM, will
depend on price. I measure qNM








To account for this price sensitivity, I use a method similar to that of Bushnell, Mansur, and
Saravia (2006) and Mansur (2007). For a given summer, I model net imports as a linear-log
function of actual price (Pt) in hour t:
q
NM








where Peakt indicates hours between 11 AM and 8 PM on weekdays, Monthmt is an indicator
variable for each summer month, Temp st measures temperature for bordering states.35 For
35The temperature variables for bordering states are modeled as quadratic functions for cooling degree
days (degrees daily mean above 65◦ F) and heating degree days (degrees daily mean below 65◦ F). As such,
Tempst has four variables for each of the four states. These data are state averages from the NOAA web
site daily temperature data.
39hour t, the idiosyncratic error term on net imports is εt. The data sources and model are
further described in Mansur (2007).
Prices are endogenous. I instrument using daily temperature variables in states in PJM
using the same functional form as described in footnote 35. Then, I interact each instrument
with both Peakt and (1 − Peakt). Note that Mansur (2007) uses load as the instrument
but—as I use load in my deﬁnition of qNM
t —these alternative temperature instruments are used
here. Wald tests of joint signiﬁcance suggest that these are strong instruments. Separately
for 1998 and 1999, Table A.1 reports the two stage least squares coeﬃcient and standard
error estimates for β1 and β2 that account for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.36
T h ee l a s t i c i t ya tt h ea v e r a g ei st h ec o e ﬃcient divided by the average supply of non-modeled
ﬁrms. I integrate the supply function and obtain variable cost estimates in order to measure
welfare.
36First I estimate the IV coeﬃcients assuming i.i.d. errors in order to calculate an unbiased estimate of ρ,
the ﬁrst-degree autocorrelation parameter. After quasi-diﬀerencing the data, I re-estimate the IV coeﬃcients
while using the White technique to address heteroskedasticity.
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Table 1: PJM Firm Characteristics 
 
Panel A: Generation Capacity by Firm and Fuel Type in 1999
a 
 
Firm Coal Oil Gas Water Nuclear  Total
Public Service Electric
b 1,607 1,842 3,311 - 3,510  10,269
PECO 895 2,476 311 1,274 4,534  9,490
GPU, Inc.  5,459 1,816 203 454 1,513  9,445
PPL, Inc.  3,923 478 1,701 148 2,304  8,554
Potomac Electric Power  3,082 2,549 876 - -  6,507
Baltimore Gas & Electric  2,265 925 755 - 1,829  5,773
Delmarva Power & Light  1,259 888 311 - -  2,458
Atlantic City Electric   391   436   482  - -  1,309
Other
c 2,087 353 - 439 -  2,880
Total 20,967 11,762 7,949 2,316 13,690  56,685
Market Share  37% 21% 14% 4% 24% 
 
















Public  Service  Electric  18.1% 14.0% 16.8% 17.3% 
PECO  16.7% 17.8% 19.9%  8.8% 
GPU,  Inc.  16.7% 19.8% 16.4% 14.7% 
PPL,  Inc.  15.1% 15.9% 16.1%  9.9% 
Potomac  Electric  Power  11.5% 10.1% 10.2% 10.4% 
Baltimore Gas & Electric  10.2%  12.5%  11.3%  11.2% 
Delmarva Power & Light  4.3%  3.2%  3.3%  6.0% 
Atlantic  City  Electric 2.3% 1.1% 1.3% 4.3% 
Other  5.1% 5.6% 4.7%  17.4% 
 
Notes: 
a)  Capacity, in megawatts (MW), is listed by primary fuel type used in each generating unit at a power plant, as 
determined by the EIA. Coal includes anthracite, bituminous coal, and petroleum coke. Oil includes No. 2, 4, 
and 6 fuel oil and kerosene. The other categories are natural gas, hydroelectric, and nuclear. Source: Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), Form 860 (1999). 
b)  In 1999, the GPU parent company owned Jersey Central, GPU Nuclear, Metropolitan Edison and Pennsylvania 
Electric. 
c)  “Other” includes the following utilities: Safe Harbor Water Power, Easton Utilities, UGI Development, 
Allegheny Electric Coop, A&N Electric Coop, and cities of Berlin, Dover, Lewes, Seaford, and Vineland. Also 
I include Edison, which purchased Homer City from GPU in March 1999. 
d)  Summer is defined as April 1 to September 30. 
e)  Source: EIA Form 759, 1999. I aggregate monthly generation for April through September. 
f)  Source: EPA Continuous Emissions Monitoring System, 1999. Peak generation share is share during hours with 
demand above 40,000 MW.  
g)  Demand served is share summer peak demand less direct access customers. On July 6, 1999, the system-wide 
demand reached a peak of 51,700 MW. Source: EIA Form 861, 1999. In 1999, many Pennsylvania customers 
switched to alternative providers, leaving GPU (3.4 percent of total market demand), PECO (5.6 percent), and 
PPL (2.5 percent).  “Other” demand includes direct access customers. Source: www.oca.state.pa.us.   51
Table 2: Summary of Intertemporal Competitive Model Estimation 
 
Dependent variable: Electricity output by unit and hour 












fixed effect  122.83 2.40 126 
pcm positive  26.76 3.45 101 
pcm -0.06 0.27 47  -0.05
pcm2 (times 1000)  -0.60 3.21 37 
pcm3 (times 1000)  0.00 0.01 33 
pcm4 (times 10
6) -0.01 0.02 30 
pcm5 (times 10
9) 0.00 0.01 28 
pcmlag 0.44 0.19 96  0.46
pcmlag2 (times 1000)  -4.02 2.44 80   
pcmlag3 (times 1000)  0.01 0.01 64 
pcmlag4 (times 10
6) -0.02 0.01 63 
pcmlag5 (times 10
9) 0.01 0.01 59 
pcmlead 1.23 0.19 121  1.27
pcmlead2 (times 1000)  -11.90 2.41 114   
pcmlead3 (times 1000)  0.04 0.01 109   
pcmlead4 (times 10
6) -0.05 0.01 106 
pcmlead5 (times 10
9) 0.02 0.01 102 
avepcm -0.04 0.34 21  1.41
avepcm2 (times 1000)  -14.19 18.34 31   
avepcm3 (times 1000)  0.47 0.42 30 
avepcm4 (times 10
6) -3.98 3.63 43 
avepcm5 (times 10
9) 10.00 10.09 45 
avepcmlag 0.76 0.29 44  0.42
avepcmlag2 (times 1000)  -13.99 17.18 27 
avepcmlag3 (times 1000)  0.11 0.40 25   
avepcmlag4 (times 10
6) -0.21 3.46 24 
avepcmlag5 (times 10
9) -0.50 9.53 25 
avepcmlead 0.19 0.29 18  1.34
avepcmlead2 (times 1000)  -17.49 17.14 21 
avepcmlead3 (times 1000)  0.38 0.40 20 
avepcmlead4 (times 10
6) -2.88 3.40 27 
avepcmlead5 (times 10
9) 7.31 9.36 31 
 
Notes: Each unit specific regression includes a constant and an indicator variable of positive 
current price-cost markups (pcm). The other variables are estimated as a fifth order polynomials. 
pcmlag is last hour’s pcm, and pcmlead is next hour’s pcm. avepcm is the daily average pcm, 
avepcmlag is yesterday’s average pcm, and avepcmlead is tomorrow’s average pcm. The unit 
fixed effect is also shown. The model’s R squared is 0.81. 
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Table 3: Welfare Implications of Production Inefficiencies, Pre- and Post-Restructuring 
using Actual Prices 
 
Type Pre- Post- Change  Percentage
  
Actual Outcomes   
Output (million MWh)  71.8 67.7 -4.1  -6%
Average Variable Costs ($/MWh)  $18.46  $22.15  $3.70   20%
Total Variable Costs ($ millions)  1325 1499 174.0  13%
  
Static Model   
  Output 71.8 67.7 -4.3  -6%
  Average Variable Costs  $16.82  $19.60  $2.78   17%
  Total Variable Costs  1207 1326 118.5  10%
  Deadweight Loss  117.8 172.8 54.9  47%
  DWL Share of Comp. Costs  (9.7%) (13.1%)  
  
Intertemporal Model   
  Output 72.0 67.7 -4.3  -6%
  Average Variable Costs  $18.49  $21.50  $3.01   16%
  Total Variable Costs  1331 1456 125.0  9%
  Deadweight Loss  -6.0 42.6 48.6 
 (Standard Errors)  (0.2) (11.2) (11.2) 
  DWL Share of Comp. Costs   (-0.5%) (3.0%)  
  
  DWL Ratio (Intertemp./Static)  -5% 20%  
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Table 4: Welfare Implications with Predicted Prices, Pre- and Post-Restructuring using 
Counterfactual Competitive Price Estimates 
 
Type Pre- Post- Change  Percentage
  
Wholesale Prices   
  Actual ($/ MWh)  26.05 37.97 11.93  46%
  (standard deviation)  (43.47) (101.00) (57.53) 132%
  Estimated ($/ MWh)  26.05 31.53 5.48  21%
  (standard deviation)  (43.47) (56.98) (13.51) 31%
   
Actual Outcomes   
Output (million MWh)  71.8 67.7 -4.1  -6%
Average Variable Costs ($/MWh)  $18.46  $22.15  $3.70   20%
Total Variable Costs ($ millions)  1325 1499 174  13%
  
Static Model   
  Output  72.0 65.4 -6.6  -9%
  Average Variable Costs  $16.60  $19.00  $2.40   14%
  Total Variable Costs  1195 1243 48  4%
  Deadweight Loss  130.6 255.2 124.6  97%
  DWL Share of Comp. Costs  (10.9%) (20.6%)  
  
Intertemporal Model   
  Output  72.0 65.4 -6.6  -9%
  Average Variable Costs  $18.49  $21.31  $2.82   15%
  Total Variable Costs  1331 1394 63  5%
  Deadweight Loss  -6.0 104.8 110.8 
  DWL Share of Comp. Costs  (-0.5%) (7.5%)  
  
  DWL Ratio (Intertemp./Static)  -5% 20%  
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Table 5: Output Production and Welfare Implications by Firm and Model, Pre- vs. Post-
Restructuring, using Actual Prices 
 
Panel A: Actual Outcomes 
   O u t p u t       T o t a l   V a r i a b l e s   C o s t s  
Firm Pre  Post Change Pre Post  Change 
Public Service  3,791  4,213 422 11% 95 137  42.8  45%
PECO 3,047  2,728 -319 -10% 66 73  6.9  10%
GPU, Inc.  19,208  18,106 -1,102 -6% 295 349  54.7  19%
PPL, Inc.  13,344  10,752 -2,592 -19% 258 244  -14.3  -6%
Potomac 11,633  12,183 550 5% 244 287  43.0  18%
Baltimore 8,772  8,700 -72 -1% 157 158  1.8  1%
Delmarva 3,522  3,129 -393 -11% 77 87  9.8  13%
Atlantic City   1,152  1,235 83 7% 29 41  12.1  42%
Other    7,320  6,613 -707 -10% 106 122  16.7  16%
Total 71,789  67,659 -4,130 -6% 1,325 1,499  173.4  13%
 
Panel B: Intertemporal Model Estimates 
   O u t p u t       T o t a l   V a r i a b l e s   C o s t s  
Firm Pre  Post Change Pre Post  Change 
Public Service  3,828  3,259 -569 -15% 96 104  8.7  9%
PECO 3,096  2,883 -213 -7% 67 74  6.8  10%
GPU, Inc.  19,213  18,033 -1,180 -6% 295 346  50.9  17%
PPL, Inc.  13,362  12,373 -989 -7% 259 280  20.9  8%
Potomac 11,701  11,331 -370 -3% 246 254  8.2  3%
Baltimore 8,780  8,785 5 0% 157 158  0.9  1%
Delmarva 3,529  3,131 -398 -11% 77 81  4.5  6%
Atlantic City   1,160  1,053 -107 -9% 29 35  5.6  19%
Other    7,319  6,811 -508 -7% 106 124  18.2  17%
Total 71,988  67,659 -4,329 -6% 1,331 1,456  124.7  9%
 
Panel C: Static Model Estimates 
   O u t p u t       T o t a l   V a r i a b l e s   C o s t s  
Firm Pre  Post Change Pre Post  Change 
Public Service  2,650  2,030 -620 -23% 56 58  2.0  4%
PECO 3,653  2,699 -954 -26% 74 61  -12.9  -17%
GPU, Inc.  20,431  18,813 -1,618 -8% 301 349  47.9  16%
PPL, Inc.  13,697  11,679 -2,018 -15% 238 245  7.0  3%
Potomac 10,444  11,874 1,430 14% 197 233  36.4  18%
Baltimore 8,931  9,457 526 6% 148 160  12.2  8%
Delmarva 3,076  2,497 -579 -19% 62 61  -1.0  -2%
Atlantic City   657  411 -246 -37% 16 13  -2.6  -16%
Other    8,245  8,198 -47 -1% 116 145  29.4  25%
Total 71,784  67,658 -4,126 -6% 1,207 1,326  118.5  10%
 
Notes: Output is measured in GWh’s (1000s of MWh) and total variables costs are measured in 
millions of dollars.   55
Table 6: Output Production and Welfare Implications by Firm and Model, Pre- vs. Post-
Restructuring, using Counterfactual Competitive Price Estimates 
 
Panel A: Actual Outcomes 
   O u t p u t       T o t a l   V a r i a b l e s   C o s t s  
Firm Pre  Post Change Pre Post  Change 
Public Service  3,791  4,213 422 11% 95 137  42.8  45%
PECO 3,047  2,728 -319 -10% 66 73  6.9  10%
GPU, Inc.  19,208  18,106 -1,102 -6% 295 349  54.7  19%
PPL, Inc.  13,344  10,752 -2,592 -19% 258 244  -14.3  -6%
Potomac 11,633  12,183 550 5% 244 287  43.0  18%
Baltimore 8,772  8,700 -72 -1% 157 158  1.8  1%
Delmarva 3,522  3,129 -393 -11% 77 87  9.8  13%
Atlantic City   1,152  1,235 83 7% 29 41  12.1  42%
Other    7,320  6,613 -707 -10% 106 122  16.7  16%
Total 71,789  67,659 -4,130 -6% 1,325 1,499  173.4  13%
 
Panel B: Intertemporal Model Estimates 
   O u t p u t       T o t a l   V a r i a b l e s   C o s t s  
Firm Pre  Post Change Pre Post  Change 
Public Service  3,828  2,611 -1,217 -32% 96 87  -9.1  -9%
PECO 3,096  2,436 -660 -21% 67 63  -4.1  -6%
GPU, Inc.  19,213  18,370 -843 -4% 295 353  57.6  20%
PPL, Inc.  13,362  11,992 -1,370 -10% 259 271  11.9  5%
Potomac 11,701  11,126 -575 -5% 246 245  -0.9  0%
Baltimore 8,780  8,214 -566 -6% 157 146  -11.2  -7%
Delmarva 3,529  2,710 -819 -23% 77 71  -5.4  -7%
Atlantic City   1,160  965 -195 -17% 29 32  3.3  11%
Other    7,319  6,984 -335 -5% 106 126  20.6  19%
Total 71,988  65,408 -6,580 -9% 1,331 1,394  62.6  5%
 
Panel C: Static Model Estimates 
   O u t p u t       T o t a l   V a r i a b l e s   C o s t s  
Firm Pre  Post Change Pre Post  Change 
Public Service  2,650  1,389 -1,261 -48% 56 39  -16.8  -30%
PECO 3,653  2,531 -1,122 -31% 74 54  -19.8  -27%
GPU, Inc.  20,431  19,081 -1,350 -7% 301 352  50.9  17%
PPL, Inc.  13,697  11,154 -2,543 -19% 238 227  -11.0  -5%
Potomac 10,444  11,393 949 9% 197 213  16.5  8%
Baltimore 8,931  9,380 449 5% 148 156  8.1  5%
Delmarva 3,076  2,026 -1,050 -34% 62 48  -13.7  -22%
Atlantic City   657  252 -405 -62% 16 8  -7.9  -49%
Other    8,245  8,196 -49 -1% 116 145  29.1  25%
Total 71,784  65,402 -6,382 -9% 1,207 1,243  36.3  3%
 
Notes: Output is measured in GWh’s (1000s of MWh) and total variables costs are measured in 
millions of dollars.   56
 
Table A.1: Non-Modeled Firms Supply Function, Pre- and Post-Restructuring 
 
Dependent variable is hourly non-modeled firms quantity supplied into PJM by year. 
 
Variable Pre-  Post- 
ln(Price)*Peak 2851.8**  1372.6** 
 (773.3)  (525.4) 
    
ln(Price)*Off-Peak 1657.8
# 841.5 
 (904.9)  (723.3) 
    
R-squared 0.08  0.19 
AR(1) coef (ρ)  0.84 0.83 
Sample size  4,330  4,341 
 
Notes:  
Table presents 2SLS coefficients. First I estimate 2SLS and use the errors to correct for serial correlation 
by estimating an AR(1) coefficient (ρ). Then I quasi-difference the data by calculating ∆x=x(t)-ρ*x(t-1) for 
all data. I re-estimate the 2SLS results using these quasi-differenced data. Robust standard errors are given 
in parentheses. Significance is marked with (**) at the 1% level, (*) at the 5% level, and (
#) at the 10% 
level. Regression includes month fixed effects, peak indicator (between 11 AM and 8 PM weekdays) and 
weather variables for bordering states (New York, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia), which are modeled 
as quadratic functions for cooling degree days (degrees daily mean below 65° F) and heating degree days 
(degrees daily mean above 65° F). In the first stage, I regress PJM ln(price) on the exogenous variables and 
instruments of daily weather for the states in PJM (Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) 
with the same flexible form as the weather for bordering states.  The sample is from April 1 to September 
30 for each year: pre-restructuring (1998) and post-restructuring (1999). 